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ABSTRACT

Use of symbolic figures in the college level world history course can provide a vehicle for studying social organization, political movements, and economic institutions of a given period. For example, Zhou Enlai, an activist and leader throughout much of the 20th century, symbolizes the major themes and forces of this era: change, industrialization, the rise of the masses, the state, nationalism, and international relations. Zhou's understanding of nationalism, political parties, and the masses is evident in the pivotal role he played in critical Chinese movements such as the May Fourth Incident (1919), the war against Japan, the Chinese Communist movement, and the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Following the establishment of the PRC, China's foreign policy, guided by Zhou, became crucial to the global balance of power. Zhou played a key role in the Bandung Conference of African and Asian States in 1955 and the reestablishment of United States-China relations in 1972. Zhou's realization of the importance of industrialization is evidenced in the efforts he made in establishing the PRC's first Five Year Plan and the Great Leap Forward. (LP)

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TEACHING WORLD HISTORY THROUGH SYMBOLIC FIGURES: ZHOU ENLAI, AN EXAMPLE

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TEACHING WORLD HISTORY THROUGH SYMBOLIC FIGURES: ZHOU ENLAI, AN EXAMPLE

Introduction

The teaching of world history demands capsulization of vast quantities of historical material, and all survey courses in world history adopt some sort of thematic approach. While this is the case in general survey courses, it is also true in the teaching of narrower periods as well. Twentieth century world history must use themes, for in this era there is much more material available than in any other single period of history. Themes allow for the capsulization of the overwhelming amount of material, but they also allow for an unimpassioned and objective treatment of very recent history. Themes, then, are a useful historical tool in a number of ways. How to add life to these themes for students in an introductory course? Certainly the histrionics of an instructor in the presentation of the material wins the interest of most students. Addedly, however, the use of historical personalities brings the themes to more life: the use of symbolic historical figures. Careful selection of symbolic figures allows for an added device for synthesizing an age of history. Such a symbolic figure provides paths for a study of social organization, political movements, economic institutions or any aspect of the study of a society or societies. One symbolic figure can also be compared with another. (World history also must have a great deal of the comparative approach as well.) There are endless publications of brief biographical vignettes of historical figures that give basic facts about the personnage. These basic facts have little meaning unless they are placed in historical perspective, analyzed and interpreted on a grander scale. It is here that the themes come into play: use the themes to place a personality into the context of an age of history. How might this be done? In this paper, I attempt to use Zhou Enlai as an example.

Main Themes of Twentieth-Century-World History

The twentieth century is a new age of history. As in all distinct ages of history, the twentieth century's foundation is based on man's past behavior; hence it is the continuous stream of history. Yet the elements of discontinuity are of such magnitude, and they are so glaring when compared to the nineteenth century that this heterodoxy makes the twentieth century an age of its own.

Foremost of the themes which differentiates the twentieth century from earlier ages is the rapid pace of change. More political, cultural, social, intellectual, and economic change has occurred in the twentieth century than in all of the preceding ages of man's history combined. It has been man's need to adjust to all of these changes which provided some idea of the complex nature of this age of history; the areas of activity to which man must adjust are multitudinous.

Modern industrialization had developed to sophisticated levels in parts of the western world during the nineteenth century; in the twentieth century it was to go far beyond those levels. Indeed, it was to be of a different nature and to burgeon to such an extent that the changes of the first industrial revolution were to look microcosmic in comparison to those of the second industrial revolution which were to come into full play during the twentieth century---and not only in the West but to every arc of the globe. Certainly, the degree of industrialization varied in the different societies; still it became the aim of all the world's societies to reach a state of sophistication which could serve the needs of each. This type of industrialization drew its strength or power source from different origins than in the nineteenth century. Industrialization was now based on electricity, oil, and chemicals

in contrast to the reliance on iron, coal, and water. From this, a new need emerged. A need for the training of professional scientists and technologists and on a grand scale. This, in turn, affected the very nature of education and educational institutions.

The scope of this industrialization was no longer left to the happenchange of past scientific discoveries. The complexity of its ramifications along with other aspects of the societies of the twentieth century brought forth an increase in the size of the role played by the state; concurrently, it meant a decline of nineteenth century liberalism in parts of the West where in some societies it was replaced by a growing involvement of the government, or by government control and, indeed, by fascism or some type of socialism. Regardless of the ideological backdrop or even the forces that were involved in its cause, the state moved forth to play a larger role---a role that was guided by planning. In societies where industrialization had already reached substantial proportions, the individual entrepreneur---even the large corporation---could not command or even finance all of the accoutrements which were needed. In societies, where the base of the economy was still agrarian, the state came forth to plan in marshalling the resources in order to attain a higher state of industrialization.

But it was not industrialization <u>per se</u> which was the sole element involved in the growth of the state's role or in planning. The twentieth century was to see the 'revolt' and rise of the broad base of society, the masses. Never before in history were the common people to have such scope, such intensity in their power as in this age. With their power, the masses have demanded and have received some sense of judicial equality and greater share of experiencing some semblance of social equanimity and economic security. And, again, not of a happenchance variety but in a more permanent

and institutionalized manner. It was the government of the state alone which could meet these needs. No longer could liberal, voluntary, or patrician approaches handle these needs and/or demands; the new status of ever-increasing numbers of a globally revolutionary population explosion could only have the requirements of a secure life met by the greatest resources and strength---and the greatest resources and strength were commanded by the state.

The state, in turn, had to be guided along the path in order to insure that it's new obligations were achieved and maintained. For in the twentieth century---even moreso than in other eras---, the state could not survive for any extended period without the approval or at least the acquiescence of the masses of the people. It was, therefore, through this need that the political party of the present day came into being in order to guide the increasingly vast machinery of the state. Single party, bi-party, or multi-party states all had to meet the same obligations and provide the same kind of guidance. In their varying ways, the leading instrument of the twentieth century had to be in touch with or to be part of the people at large. Those of any longevity came to operate through the political party which was and is an instrument for reflecting mass sentiment. The political party, in contrast to those of an early age, had dropped its elitism, had expanded in operation, and had developed an institutionalized mechanism to reach the grassroots of every society. Not to do so, had come to mean its end or reduction to inconsequentia.

In this new setting of the twentieth century with a new central role for the masses, an implement was necessary to have the common people express their desires. As a result, the political party of a far different variety from the more casual or social type was developed. A party that had a more clearly-defined goal, that had more discipline, that had an expanded

framework which include organizational devices touching all the people in a society, and that had a more accountable leadership.

This accountable leadership, again, had its role altered from the past in light of the changes which had become a part of twentieth century society. Here the leader or leaders had to maintain an appeal to the masses, and in maintaining this appeal he had to have the needs and desires of the people constantly in mind even though the contact might not be actual or direct.

Nationalism in the twentieth century was to take on new and expanded forms. As is true with all of these era-making forces, nationalism was to have different emphases and varied directions in the diverse societies of the globe. Yet, over-all it was to be a nationalism of greater intensity and more emotionalism; in certain societies it was to be whetted by anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. Understandably, nationalism was multi-faceted: it served as the base for channelling the loyalties and energies of the totality of components of the society; it provided the basis for the expression of a greater unity within, and it was an expression of a cohesive strength within the international community.

The international community itself changed dramatically during the twentieth century. When the century opened, the world was basically dominated by the European civilization---at least the dynamics of decision-making around the globe where highly influenced by the Europeans. All of this, however, was going to change. During the course of the century, Europe's star set and declined. New forces moved in to fill a vacuum. First the United States and the USSR served the basis of a bi-polar international community; then, this bi-polarity gave way to a multi-polar global system where more and independent forces became part of the decision-making process on the world's stage.

These, then, are the major themes which have helped to shape and to define the nature of the twentieth century world. At least it was this kind

of world into which Zhou Enlai was born, was nurtured, matured and was active. In fact, Zhou's life spanned seventy-six years of twentieth century world history: he was born in 1898 and died in early 1976. Being the activist and leader that he was, he symbolizes---in one way or another---the major themes and forces of the century. As well as any prominent global figure, Zhou Enlai was the symbol of an age.

Zhou Enlai As A Symbol

One of the dynamic forces of twentieth-century-world history is nationalism. It was a force which Zhou Enlai understood very clearly---and one which influenced his work until his death.

Zhou Enlai had reached manhood when the event which capsulized the previous few decades of Chinese history exploded. This was the May Fourth Incident which captured the emotions of so many of the Chinese and brought into focus nationalism of a different variety from the past. After this event in 1919 Chinese attitudes toward reform and toward nationalism would never be the same again. As it affected all other active members of the intelligentsia and beyond, so it was to have an influence on Zhou Enlai.

Even before this event, Zhou had been active in movements of reform. In 1911, at the age of ten, Zhou cut off his queue in a spirit of change and nationalism. During his student days at Nankai Middle School in Tianjin, Zhou had articulated his awareness that some very radical changes had to take place if China were "to stand up" once again. He had become an editor of the student newspaper and active in the student union, from both of these platforms he called for major changes in Chinese society, changes that would strengthen China. As a member of a student organization, frequently he contributed to the group's newspaper castigating the nation's leadership and called for unity, for patriotism, for opposition to foreign aggression, and for economic and social progress.

When Zhou Enlai was nineteen, and soon after he was graduated from Nankai, he travelled to Japan as had many other Chinese of his generation. In a way, Japan served as a dichotomous symbol to many Chinese. Japan had become an example of Asian progress; she had modernized most of her institutions, had grown so strong that she was able to defeat a European power in the Russo-Japanese War. Simultaneously, however, she had joined other powers in making greater inroads on Chinese sovereignty; therefore, she added a scar to the Chinese national image. But how did she reach her new stature? This was one of the attractions for the Chinese students. It was one of the attractions to Zhou Enlai. And also the Japanese success story affected so many other societies of what came to be called the Third World.

The outburst coming from the May Fourth Incident provided an incentive for Zhou to scurry back to China to join what came to be the beginning of a movement.

Zhou had spent nearly two years in Japan where he lived with a classmate of Nankai days and where he audited classes at times at the University of Tokyo and, at others, at the University of Kyoto. He had gone to Kyoto primarily to meet and hear Professor Hajimi Kawakame, Japan's socialist scholar. Yet the outburst of the events of May 4th lured him home to Tianjin.

Upon his return, he became an active leader in a new group in Tianjin called the Awakening Society which also published its own newspaper. He wrote for the paper and participated in demonstrations against the police who tried to suppress the students who were calling for action against the Japanese concessions in Shandong. These activities in Tianjin were part of a nation wide pattern. Many areas with comparable groups were part of a growing foundation for a New China. It was nationalism, new, intense, and fervid.

The ferment after 1919 was never to subside again. But what direction was Chinese nationalism to take if it were to become consolidated and effective. This was a problem to be faced by Zhou Enlai and many others. In the end Zhou was to conclude that the only way for China to consolidate and to make progress was through Marxism. Why Zhou Enlai turned to Marxism as the road for Chinese strength probably involved many features. To him, at least, it was probably the surest road.

Zhou Enlai became a Communist while he was in France and became an active member in the Chinese Communist Party after his return in 1924. At the same time, some of the other nationalist forces that were energized by the May Fourth Incident held more paramountcy than the CCP---mainly the re-energized movement of Sun Yat-sen which had received much needed support from the new USSR, in return for which Sun agreed to allow individual CCP members into his Guomindong (GMD). This was the foundation of the first Popular Front in the twentieth century, and Zhou Enlai became a main instrument in providing the cooperation of the GMD and the Communists in this Popular Front which was to work toward strengthening and re-unifying the Chinese national state. In so doing, Zhou remained a member of the CCP and even worked closely with the Comintern, yet his ultimate goal was for Chinese national strength and solidarity. Even after Sun Yat-sen's death removed an important solidifying influence from the Popular Front, Zhou Enlai continued to support it. It seems that he felt it to be the only chance for a re-unified China. However, soon after Sun Yat-sen's death, the Popular Front began to disintegrate, and it fell to pieces with Chiang Kai-shek's attack on the Chinese Communists in Shanghai on April 12, 1927.

The Popular Front was gone, and the CCP had suffered a serious blow. Zhou and other survivors of the GMD's Shanghai attack retreated to the

South. It was here that Zhou was part of the operation in forming the Red Army. He had been closely associated with military operations since the early days of the Popular Front, and he now put his knowledge to work in helping to structure the new military force. The Red Army grew in size and strength, yet it failed to inflict a defeat of any consequence on the GMD forces.

Zhou's strategy differed from that of Mao's at this stage. His idea was to use the army in a direct attack on the GMD and on their urban bases rather than use the tactics of guerilla warfare propounded by Mao. The failure of Zhou's ideas at the Nanzhang uprising of August 1, 1927 seemed to start a process that would bring him more and more to accept Mao's ideas of warfare.

Despite the failure of the Nanzhang uprising, it marked "the emergence of military power as a factor within the Chinese Communist movement."

The cause of Chinese nationalism had reached another low state. Chiang Kai-shek had attacked the CCP and hoped to eradicate it. Zhou's attempts to move strongly against the GMD had harmed the cause of the CCP. Addedly, the Japanese had taken Manchuria and continued to make inroads into northern China. This provided the setting for the Long March in 1934-35.

After the Shanghai "massacre," the Chinese Communists established their main base on the Hunan-Jiangxi border area. As they saw the approaching devastation coming from GMD encirclement, the Communists decided to abandon the Jiangxi base. Reasons for the CCP leaving their Jiangxi base are many, but among the stated reasons by the Communist leadership was to have a base in closer proximity to the Japanese and where the Chinese Communists could more easily attack them. As it turned out, this was to become one of the

major arenas of action and which Zhou Enlai personally helped to shape, for the handsome Chinese Communist was an integral mover in the dramatic events of December 12, 1936 when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped. Although the details of the maneuverings of the event in Xian are complex and far from clear, the results are. Zhou Enlai, Chiang Kai-shek, and others reached an agreement which would allow for a unified Chinese national effort in response to the growing Japanese menace to Chinese sovereignty. The CCP recognized Chiang as the national leader and accepted his predominant position. It was a return to the Popular Front arrangement of the mid-1920's and for much the same reasons: to give the Chinese nation as much unity as possible, hence to gain strength at home to counteract imperialism from abroad.

In part, this seemingly greater Chinese national unity which grew out of the Xian incident brought a stepped up policy on the part of Japan in her aggression against China; fearing that the Chinese nation would consolidate its strength, Japan attacked in July 1937. The second Sino-Japanese war had started in full force; these military operations were the start of World War II. Chiang Kai-shek, Zhou Enlai, and others were at a conference in Lushan, Jiangxi ironing out the details of the new unity when the guns began to fire.

The rapid advance of Japan into China forced Chiang Kai-shek to move his capital ever westward until he settled in the remote province of Sichuan; Chongqing became the wartime capital. It was a portrait of unity still: where Chiang went, Zhou followed; he became an emblem of support for Chinese unity by being the main liaison officer of the CCP, a post he filled into 1943.

The unity was, however, more apparent than actual. As early as 1939, military clashes occurred between the GMD and CCP armies. And as the war

dragged on, it appeared that the CCP---and Zhou---increasingly grew to realize that Chiang and the GMD could not provide unity for China and could not gain and maintain the allegiance and loyalty of the Chinese nation. The contrast between the adherence and loyalty to Yanaan where the CCP had moved in 1935 by the people in the Communist area was blatant when compared to the lack of adherence by the masses to the Chiang regime; a contrast noted by some strong critics of communism as well as by its well-wishers or even neutralists.

When the United States entered the war, she made efforts---some honest as well as some dishonest---to have a united Chinese effort against the Japanese. The U.S. efforts proved to no avail. China had no unity until the end of the Chinese civil war which came only months after the defeat of Japan and until the ultimate success of Chinese Communists in proclaiming the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949

Certainly, Zhou Enlai with his intelligence and perception could see the state of affairs while he was spending those years in Chongqing and that any chance for a restored Chinese dignity could not emanate from Chongqing's government or from Nanjing where Chiang had returned after Japan's defeat. Chiang had "lost his mandate"---if this expression can be used with validity.

Despite the growing futility of chances for strength to emerge from Chiang's leadership, Zhou Enlai continued to work out his role in Chongqing. What did he achieve? He achieved a great deal for China but not from his official duties; instead, it was success from unofficial movements. He met and talked with many Chinese from all walks of life and especially intellectuals---young and old; he met, talked, and socialized with foreign diplomats, journalists, and commentators. Many to be impressed with this dignified representative of China---albeit a Communist. These

impressive contacts served a purpose in gaining some positive support after October 1, 1949 and the proclamation of the "New China".

China had been ushered into a new age, and although Zhou Enlai's role was expanded enormously; he still worked toward nationalist goals. It was true, as Mao Zedong stated in his proclamation speech, that China had "stood up" again but the solid foundation for the expression of international stature still had a long way to go. Zhou as premier and Zhou as foreign minister would work toward both goals for the rest of his life---and with great success. But internal Chinese wounds could not be healed easily; too much Chinese blood had been spilled by Chinese for an oiled gate to unity to be opened. To this task---along with many others---the new premier now turned his intellect, his abilities, and his energies.

How steadfast Zhou Enlai was in his purpose can be seen by the policies of the new government compared to his now famous Shao Shan Report which he articulated in late 1930 when he was trying to weld a divided Chinese Communist Party together. Of course, few could foresee in late September 1930 that a minuscule, bedraggled, battered, and divided political group would provide the leadership of a new government almost nineteen years later to the day.

Zhou in his Shao Shan Report was very forceful, very optimistic, and very determined that work in gaining control of a unified nation must be done with thought and care---not carelessly and not opportunistically. Policies should be carried forth moderately at first in order to allow the Chinese people an opportunity to see th benefits of a new order. As he stated in 1930, so he was to act in 1949. His utterances as the main voice of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee was in direct keeping with a policy to gain the broadest support possible for the

New China. No wide scale and immediate collectivization of land, no immediate grasping of industrial private enterprise, no frantic suppression of different-minded intellect. In fact, Zhou pleaded, cajoled, and tried to convince the otherwise-minded to support the new regime; he even sent telegrams to hundreds of intellectuals who had fled to Hong King to return. Later, he was to issue a report on intellectuals which carried the same theme. It was Zhou Enlai who issued the first statement of what is still called the controversial Hundred Flower's Campaign in January 1956. Again during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the ubiquitous Zhou continued to work toward cementing into unity the various viewpoints in China. The increasing number of guests who visited China in the 1970's reported similar comments from Zhou Enlai from their various interviews.

In the early days, only those who totally rejected the new order were treated harshly. Most were not. Throughout, from 1949 to 1976, it was not the "blood bath" but the process of education which was used to convince those who were delinquent in accepting the "true word". It was Zhou Enlai in 1930, in 1949, and still in 1976 who emphasized moderation and who called for national unity. Certainly, the order continued to change, but it was not done with the stroke of the "two-edged" sword but mainly in the spirit of Shao Shan!

Nationalism---as is true with most policies of most governments most of the time---has its domestic goals as well as its international role. Until the period after 1949, China rarely had a voice in the decision-making process of the Twentieth Century. After China "stood up" on 1 October 1949, things would change. In fact, the PRC as much as any other nation or region would be responsible for an entirely different framework for the global power balance. This was apparent by the early 1960's, but it did have its

background; and Zhou Enlai was to be the main spokesman for the policies of his government. From 1949 until 1958, he was foreign minister as well as premier. No other member of the CCP or the State Council was better suited for the post. By 1949 Zhou Enlai had had over twenty years experience of operating in a position of great delicacy---from his work as political director of the new Huangpu Academy to his work with the Comintern, at the Xian Incident in 1936, liaison officer in Chongqing, discussing and negotiating with Generals Patrick Hurley and George C. Marshall in 1944 and 1945. But after 1949, Zhou Enlai had to function in a different framework. What was the framework? What were his goals?

Understandably, during the early years of the People's Republic, he worked to gain recognition for the new regime. But ultimately, as the PRC developed greater internal unity, stability and strength, he worked to gain a more equitable international power system within a global framework; therefore, Zhou Enlai's work in international politics operated on two levels: the hoped-for short- range goal of establishing diplomatic relations with the governments of the world and the longer ranged one of a new international order. Both, of course, were part of the same goal---the attainment of Chinese national dignity.

Recognition of the PRC came quickly from some states, mainly Communist governments of eastern Europe and Asia. Gaining broader recognition, being admitted to the United Nations, and hoping for a different international power system was blocked by the Korean War. Europe's decline as the world pace-setter became totally apparent from the nature and from the results of World War II - a development that was in its incipient stages at the time of Zhou Enlai's birth and which now was fully clear when he became the premier of the new Chinese government. The bi-polar leadership of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. had emerged to fill the vacuum and, in turn, this dual leadership

had evolved into the 'Cold War'. Conflict in Korea made it hot. This situational conflict was not in the best interests of the new PRC, and it was a battle which Zhou Enlai had tried to use his talents in avoiding. Zhou Enlai worked hard to prevent the United States from going to war in Korea; he failed momentarily in his efforts of striking a world order that would not be divided in two as it was. In the long run, however, his efforts would be fruitful.

Through the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's his talks, discussions, and speeches were riddled with opposition to 'great nation chauvinism' and imperialism. The Korean War had his bellicosity directed primarily against the United States. Even during the mid-1950's when China seemed to be closely allied with the USSR, the Soviet leaders twinged nervously at that statement. As time went on, the PRC increasingly refused to accept direction from the USSR which surfaced into the Sino-Soviet conflict. Obviously, Mao Zedong's statement of China standing up had meaning---China would not exchange imperialism from from one quarter for another. For the world to be divided into two armed camps was unhealthy for the world---it was equally unhealthy for the PRC. It hardly allowed nations other than the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. to have dignity.

But that situation would pass, and Zhou Enlai seemed to know it. Even in the 1950's he saw that the U.S.A. had extended itself far beyond its capacity. Simultaneously, the revived, re-energized, and newly developing states of the world were speaking with an increasingly independent voice. Zhou Enlai grasped each opportunity. No part of the task, however, was easy.

One super-power, the United States, had assisted Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD in trying to prevent a victory by the CCP; therefore, she was antagonistic from the start. The events of the Korean War added to the

enmity, the emotions, and a bad press for the PRC in the West. The other super-power, the USSR, became an ally starting with a pact which Zhou Enlai signed in Moscow with Andrei Vyshynsky in February, 1950. As it turned out, the pact was interpreted differently as time went by. China looked upon it as a treaty between equals; the USSR acted as though the PRC was under the guiding hand of Moscow. Numerous events and incidents subsequently brought this difference in approach to the open rupture of Sino-Soviet antagonism instead of harmony. Now openly and directly Zhou Enlai included the USSR when he talked of "great nation imperialism".

But by the time that this festering feud became open, Zhou Enlai had made gains in weakening the control practised by the two super powers. First of all at Geneva in early 1954 where major diplomats were meeting to settle problems of Korea and Indo-China, he was able to assert some substantial influence in convincing some of those he met that the People's Republic was not a danger but that she was working toward international harmony and stability and not causing conflict and instability. His entire demeanor emphasized this policy when he talked with statesmen. He even tried unsuccessfully to shake hands with John Foster Dulles. At the end of the conference, he took the time to visit the aging, yet internationally popular, Charlie Chaplin.

In April 1955, Zhou attended the Bandung Conference of African and Asian states. To this point in his career, Bandung was to be his "shining hour". Even though China had not been among the organizers of the conference, Zhou became one of the stars of the gathering. It was his second major opportunity to publicize the PRC's policy, goals, and image. He condemned imperialism, and he called for "peaceful coexistence". So as early as 1954, Zhou already represented a new and different power base outside of the U.S.A. or U.S.S.R. influence. Europe's decline had been followed by the rise of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., now that duel-power base

was going to be replaced by a multi-powered one.

In 1953, Zhou Enlai left the post of foreign minister in the State Council; it appeared that he had to in light of his enormous work commitments. At the same time, however, he continued to be active and speak on foreign policy matters. In 1963 and 1964 on his "safari" to Africa he visited most of the independent states, many of which had never been visited by a statesman of such high rank before. He revived the "spirit of Bandung" and issued statements which outlined China's policy toward Africa. Again, he attacked imperialism, and he called for non-alignment and spoke of self-reliance. He pointedly attacked any interference in the internal affairs of African countries by any other power. In effect, the Chinese leader was defining the need for a multi-polar world which served the interests of each nation's peaceful needs as well as serving the cause of international stability far more than did the old framework of bi-polarity. Through Zhou Enlai, the People's Republic of China had as important an effect on the emergence of more clearly defined twentieth century multi-powered world order as anything else. Throughout most of the century, the world had groped for a clearly defined order as change after change occurred; the new global balance was fairly clear in the mid-1960's, but it had become more clearly a part of the world's way when Zhou Enlai and President Richard M. Nixon issued a joint communique from Shanghai in February 1972 which explicitly stated the concept of multipolarity.

The visit of Nixon to the PRC had evolved slowly from ambassadorial talks in Warsaw which had been set up at the Geneva Conference of 1954. The U.S. President's visit clearly revealed the U.S. acceptance of multipolarity as well as her acceptance of the status and dignity of the PRC, a goal toward which Zhou had worked since 1949. Although formal

U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations were to be established in January 1979---three years after Zhou's death---the foundation had been established in 1972.

Even before the U.S. formal recognition of the PRC, Zhou Enlai had met with Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei in September of 1972 to establish diplomatic relations with Japan.

Zhou Enlai's understanding of nationalism and his work in global politics were testaments to his grasp of the forces which were molding twentieth century world history. In both of these examples he worked with changes as they occurred in a changing world.

Throughout his entire life, he saw the importance of the force of industrialization, but it was after 1949 that his work was intertwined with practice instead of thought. It was Zhou Enlai who first made the pronouncement of the goals of the PRC's first Five-Year Plan in February 1953. His report to the first meeting of the National People's Congress in September, 1954 after the implementation of the new constitution was full of information and detailed data which included the progress of industrialization, and in September 1956 he was to issue the call and to describe the goals of the second Five Year Plan. In the period of the Great Leap Forward, it was Zhou who described what had been and had not been attained. Even throughout the years of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution, he went from group to group and from region to region announcing his slogan to "carry out revolution and promote production." So many of his speeches, discussions, and reports were based on the People's Republic's progress and her needs in industrialization. A large portion of his statement on the PRC's "great decade" on the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the new government was riddled with enormous detail on China's growing industrialization. Certainly, he saw the need for and worked for the attainment of more sophisticated technological use of industrial strength. No society in

the twentieth century world could provide for the growing needs of the masses, and no nation could enjoy the benefits of security without it.

As much or more than any society in the world China used the strength of the state to make maximum use of her resources---state planning. Again, Zhou Enlai was in the midst of it all. He was the one to make major pronouncements on planning throughout his life. It was Zhou who worked to make the enormous state machinery operate as efficiently, cohesively, and harmoniously as possible, for he was the leading spokesman for the state continually from the establishment of the PRC until his death. In its early days, the People's Republic was guided administratively by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee of which Zhou was the main spokesman; he was chairman of the committee which was established to write the constitution in January, 1953; and when the constitution began to operate in 1954, he was named premier at the first meeting of the new National People's Congress. He was to be re-confirmed in that post at each succeeding Congress until his death. During the Cultural Revolution, Zhou worked hard and long to see that organizational direction would not be disrupted, for he, indeed, realized that the organization of the state machinery was one of the forte's of the PRC and an absolute necessity in China's twentieth-century-world society.

Industrialization, planning, and the role of the state---themes of twentieth-century-world history---continued to be foci of Zhou to the closing months of his life. At the Forth National People's Congress in July, 1975, he called for the four modernizations: progress in industrialization, science and technology, agriculture, and national defense. Although these goals are popularly associated with Deng Xiaoping, they were first expressed publicly by Zhou Enlai in what is usually referred to as his "last testament."

In China, the state machinery put into practice the policies defined by the party. The new role of the masses demanded a new party philosophy and apparatus. In the PRC, the party and the people became one. Throughout his entire life Zhou was to be part of the development of both these organisms. As a student in Tianjin, already he was talking and writing about the need for these changes. As we have already seen, he was part of the leadership of the CCP almost from its foundation and remained so until his passing. So it was with his attention in working toward making the masses and the party a single unit. This attitude he clearly described in a speech in 1959:

> The Party has always paid attention to combining its leadership with broad mass movements, guiding the masses to raise the level of their revolutionary consciousness constantly, and to organize their own strength to emancipate themselves step by step, instead of imposing revolution on the masses or bestowing victory on the masses as a favor.

His understanding of the role of the party and the role of the masses as well as his understanding of the many other facets of the twentieth century has made him close to an ideal as a symbol for twentieth-century-world history.

Conclusion

Nothing written in the English---or any other---language to this point has captured that elusive quality called the "spirit of the man" when it comes to describing the life of Zhou Enlai. Nothing has been written about Premier Zhou to place him in the context of the changing society of China or to place him in the wider scale of global prespectives of which China was an important segment by virtue of her size in territory and population and because of her location. Yet Zhou Enlai was symbolic of changes that took place in China as well as those changes of global porportaions.

Born in 1898 when China was ready to burst at the seams with indignation over the misiule of the Qing empire, swollen to the eruptive stage with hopes of meeting the challenges of a new age, and filled with contempt and humiliation at China's treatment by the foreign imperialists, Zhou until his death on January 8, 1976, lived and was part of an age of transformation for China and for the world.

1905 was a year that 'shook the world,' and it also shook China. A revolution with broad popular support had changed Russia from an autocracy into a constitutional monarchy. Concurrently, Japan, a non-western nation, defeated Russia, a European power in a war. In China, the traditional examination system, and avenue to wealth and power in the past, was abolished. Zhou Enlai was seven years old and was starting his elementary school years at a school in Shenyang (Mukden) which gave a substantial amount of access to western ideas. (He had already been tutored at home in classical Chinese education, in English, and in some angles of western thought.)

Japan's defeat of Russia, plus the success of the revolutionaries in Russia in changing the bases of social and political institutions had a global impact. Revolutions and nationalist uprisings moved to shatter old institutions in many parts of the world, such as Iran (1906), the Ottoman

Empire (1908), Mexico (1910), and in China (1911). Western imperialism was either attacked or criticized in India, in Indo-China, and in the Philipines at about the same years.

The Qing rule of China gasping for air from what was seemingly a death rattle tried to breathe new life into a dying body with reforms during the first decade of the new century. It was to bring 'too little and too late.' The Manchus were divested of their power in 1911-1912. Too little and too late, for by this time too many changes in the social organization of China had become a fact. In the cities, especially in the treaty ports where western powers had had enormous influence for almost seventy years, a new elite was emerging and where western learning and urban money-making had become objectives and goals.

As an adolescent, Zhou Enlai lived in Shanghai with one uncle then moved to Shenyang to live with another. During these years, Zhou had become part of the new learning and had been exposed to the benefits---as well as the humiliations---of the western dominated treaty ports. Certainly, Shanghai was a prime example. In Shenyang, Japan, a modernized Asian nation, continued to expand her influence. By the age of fourteen, when Zhou Enlai left elementary school, he had already begun to voice his views of the need for a new China and of the need for reform and change. Coming from a family of elitist status based on the old and traditional formula, he directed himself to be a member of a status group based on the new formula.

Upon leaving elementary school in 1912, Zhou had hoped to study in the United States under the auspices of the foundation administering the funds from the Boxer indemnity; he was unsuccessful for all of the places had already been filled for his native province of Jiangxu. Instead of moving to the USA, he moved to Tianjin, entered Nankai Middle School, and came

under the influence of Zhang Bolin, the school's founder and principal.

> Tientisin (Tianjin) had the largest number of separated controlled concessions. In addition to the British, French, Japanese, Italian, and Belgian concessions, there were those of Germany and Austria-Hungary, which had been taken over by the Japanese in 1914....

Obviously, the situation was one to spur on the nationalist activities of a young man already highly motivated for change and for the expression of new learning and for a new role for China. Influences on Zhou from the treaty-port atmosphere reached added dimensions from his experience at a school where the principal was totally dedicated to the new learning and for the development of a new China. Zhou, here, added to his knowledge of philosophies and views that were increasingly divorced from Chinese traditional views.

During these years that Zhou was in middle school, World War I had broken out and continued for a year after he was graduated. China's participation in the war was minimal after she joined the Allied side in 1917. Yet the effect on China---as on most of the world's societies---was substantial. The War added to China's growing industrialization; it added to her social mobility; and it abetted a growing partriotism and nationalism that had been developing for two or three decades.

World War I gave strong indication that Europe'e strength had declined; in fact, one of its members, Russia, experienced a revolution that toppled its old institutions in toto. The result was a whole new economic, social, and political system. Simultaneously, the United States emerged to play a decisive global role indicated by her tilting the balance of the war in the favor of the Allies. Two seemingly new and refreshing forces had been let loose: the United States preaching political democracy, self-determination of the people, anti-colonialism, and a call for a new global order. The preacher was the president of the United States,

Woodrow Wilson. Russia, soon to be called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), was propounding the themes of a new social order, emancipation of labor, anti-imperialism, and self-determination of people. The proponent was N. Lenin, the main leader of Russia's November 1917 Revolution. Both of these states announced their programs to the world, and for the first time in modern history they presented a choice of directions which societies might take in solving problems and in reaching new goals for their nation's people. Old style European hegemony had suffered another blow---as it had in the Russo-Japanese War---; Lenin and Wilson seemed to allow the unshackling of forces that had only waited for an opening to emerge into action.

In appearance, China was in a pitiful and disintegrated state with warlords and their private armies vying for control of as much territory as possible. The official Republican government controlled little beyond a few provinces surrounding the capital city. Yet this image of China was not totally a true one. Despite warlord rivalry and despite a weak and ineffectual central government, China continued to operate what was a single social system. These elements, such as warlords, that gave an indication of being divisive, all sought domination of a unified China; there was no talk of separatism or secession. But this single Chinese system was not the old traditional China. New education and a new elite had surfaced; urban workers were increasingly rootless with little or no connection to their earlier rural base. Many landlords of large domains often lived in the city; landowning by the peasants became smaller as the population continued to expand. A "propertied proletariat" in the rural areas had come into existence. China continued as a single system, but it was far different from the old single system that had lasted for many centuries. A new China had emerged.

These and many more forces were having an effect on Zhou Enlai and others who were part of a different generation of Chinese elite. Writing in a student journal at the Nankai Middle School (1913-1917), Zhou was highly critical of his "nation's venal leadership," and he placed stress on "the need for unity, patriotism, and resistance to foreign aggression." He also made a plea for "economic and social progress." These were topics being discussed by all active and educated members of a new generation in China.

After being graduated from Nankai at the head of his class in 1917 and in continued pursuit of more education, Zhou took off for Japan. In less than two years, he returned to China to participate in the May 4th movement. While in Japan and after his return to China, he began to study and to show an interest in socialism. This interest perdured when he went to France in 1920, and where he became a communist. So Zhou---as with others of his generation in other of the world's societies---turned to the twentieth-century-world theme of socialism as a means for gaining the needs for their societies. Whether consciously or not, Zhou in effect had chosen Leninism over Wilsonianism.

Zhou had become a communist; he remained a communist for the rest of his life. Concurrently, he remained a Chinese nationalist and an anti-imperialist. He came to rely on the agency of the Chinese Communist Party as the means for achieving greater national, social, political, and cultural unity. It was the CCP which would bring the rural and urban sectors of Zhou's nation together.

A large segment of the generation of the May 4th movement came to look upon the Chinese peasant as a 'comrade-in-arms' for the greater unity and benefit of China. The peasant masses were not to be treated with contempt or patronizingly. Zhou Enlai came to realize the importance of the broad

base of society. The CCP---as with all successful political parties of the twentieth century---would have to have the party work in harmony with the masses. "The CCP was not to be a party of peasants but was to be a party that blended with the peasants."

Zhou Enlai was obviously not a "hero in history," yet he had charisma which continued to be evident into the years after his death both in the PRC and in the worldwide community. From his elementary school days until his death, he symbolized his age: he was active in the study of the new ideas professed by Charles Darwin, by John Stuart Mill, as well as those of Karl Marx, N. Lenin, and others. From at least 1911 until his death, he was a nationalist working for the strength and integrity of a new China. Starting at the Nankai Middle School until his death, he sponsored ideas for greater social and economic progress which meant expanded productivity in the agrarian and industrial sectors of Chinese society. From May 4, 1919 and from his sojourn in France, he was part of a political organization that reached out to the grassroots of the Chinese population. After the success of the revolution in 1949, Zhou's activities were directed toward a role for China in a multipolar international power order and in the new Global framework of the twentieth-century world.